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BOOK REVIEW
THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA. By A. Frank Reel, The University
of Chicago Press 1949. pp. 324. $4.00.
In October 1944 Lieutenant General Tomoyuki
churia to command the Japanese Army defending
under attack by American forces. One year later, the
rendered to the American authorities on Luzon, and
World War II "war criminals".

Yamashita came out of Manthe Philippine Islands, then
famous Tiger of Malaya surthus, became the first of the

The War Crimes Division of General MacArthur's Judge Advocate Office
had been laboring many months preparing the case against General Yamashita.
Able army lawyers had roamed the islands and provinces, taking statements and
affidavits from aggrieved citizens, and soldiers all attesting to the extreme brutalities of the Japanese soldiers. On December 7th, four months after the surrender,
and on the 4th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the results of their efforts were realized.
A military commission of three majors and two brigadier generals, none of whom
was a lawyer, pronounced Yamashita guilty of violating the laws of war, in that
he failed to discharge his duty as a commander, and to control the members of
his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities. In February 1946,
General Yamashita was stripped of his uniform and hanged as a common criminal.
Captain A. Frank Reel was an attorney on duty with the Claims Service in
the Philippines at the time of Yamashita's surrender. Against his wishes, he
suddenly found himself assigned to the task of defending the notorious general.
The principal book is his version of the progress and development of this historic
trial. While probably written for tlhe lay reader, it is nevertheless a significant
contribution to a very controversial field of the law. It is especially anothLr reminder
of the serious defects in our system of military justice and martial law. It points
out just how counter to the Anglo-American tradition of justice, are trials by
military tribunals.
Speed was the keynote of the trial. Yamashita surrendered on Sept. 3rd, 1945.
On Sept. 25 he was charged with being a war criminal. Two weeks later he was
arraigned and served with a bill of sixty-four particulars, which the Judge Advocate
General had been months in preparing. Trial was set for October 29th. The bill
of particulars alleged murder, massacre, rape, pillage of innocent noncombatants.

mistreatment and starvation of American prisoners and civilian internees, and
wanton devastation and destruction of public, private and religious property. On
the day set for trial a "supplemental" bill of particulars was filed containing
fifty-nine new items, all involving new places, new persons, new witnesses. Confronted with this mass of material to rtbut, the hurriedly appointed defense staff
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moved for a continuance. Their motion was denied. The Commission did agree
not to receive evidence on the supplemental bill until the original bill was disposed
of, but they violated this pledge three days after the trial started. This matter of
speed particularly impressed the late Justice Rutledge, who said that the burden
placed on the defense was not only "tremendous", it was "impossible".
As "a further means of saving time", General MacArthur's headquarters had
issued a directive permitting the Commission to admit proof of the alleged atrocities committed by Yamashita's troops through the use of ex parte affidavits,
depositions, opinion and hearsay, without the personal appearance of witnesses to
testify and thus become subject to cross-examination in open court. When witnesses did appear, and defense counsel sought to cross-examine them, the Commission displayed impatience, and at one point ordered that . . . "cross examinations be limited to essentials". They frequently invoked the MacArthur directive
to prevent defense attacks on a witness's credibility. Justice Murphy was later to
describe the Commission's procedure and attitude as one of "needless and unseemly haste".
Capt. Reel and tht other members of the defense staff were quickly convinced that Yamashita was being judicially lynched, and after the initial conferences and interviews with the General and his associates they apparently became
convinced that he was not guilty of the things of which he was charged. They had
no intention of going along with what they termed a well planned drama, but
rather were intent upon fighting for whatever modicum of justice might be available for their man. They continued to object to evidence that they considered
improper; they vainly insisted on the right of cross-examination in great detail;
they attempted to invoke the safeguards accorded an accused by congressional
statutes and international treaties, and by the Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition. In
a memorandum attached to their original motion to dismiss, the defense counsel
had written: "As officers of the U. S. Army, and as lawyers appointed to defend
the accused, defense counsel are charged with a duty to the accused, to the Army,
and to the people of the United States to pursue all proper legal remedies open
to the defense, including, if warranted, recourse to the Federal Courts, and more
particularly, the Supeme Court of the United States."
Groundwork for the expected appeal had been laid with the initial motion
to dismiss. It was defense counsel's contention that the Military Commission did
not have the power to try the case or conduct the proceedings as it did. This was
a jurisdictional attack based on the theory that the power of military tribunals
over offenses against the laws of war ends with the cessation of hostilities. They
further claimed that such jurisdiction is limited by Statutory and treaty requirements and that the charge against Yamashita did not set forth a violation of the
laws of war. They contended that the Military Commission did not comply with
Article 60 of the Geneva Convention of 1929 (47 Stat 2051), which provides
that, before a prisoner of war is tried, the neutral State representing his country
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is to be given notice. Switzerland had been the neutral power designated by Japan
for the protection of its prisoner, and no notice was ever given to Switzerland.
Similarly, they argued that the Commission did not comply with Article of War
25 (41 Stat 792, 10 U.S.C. 1496) which prohibits the use of depositions in a
capital case before a military tribunal; that Article of War 38 (41 Stat 794, 10
U.S.C. 1509) which provides that regulations prescribing rules of evidence and
procedure in such cases shall not prescribe anything "contrary or inconsistent with"
the other Articles of War, and Article 63 of the Geneva Convention of 1929
(47 Stat 2052), which permits trial of prisoners of war only before the same
courts and by the same procedure as the nation holding them prisoners uses for its
own military personnel. Thus, they argued, General MacArthur's aforementioned
directive with respect to depositions, ex parte affidavits, hearsay and opinion,
transgressed the jurisdictional limitations upon the Commission's authority, and
rendered them without power to enter a valid sentence, and since statutes and
treaties were thus violated, Yamashita was being deprived of due process of law,
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court rendered its decision on Februray 4th, 1946 (327 U.S.
1, 66 S. Ct 340). The entire court was of the opinion that American military
tribunals could try captured enemy belligerents. The majority felt that hostilities
did not cease until peace was officially established, and that the charge did set
out a violation of the laws of war. They held that the Articles of War cited by the
defense did not apply to enemy combatants charged with an act of unlawful belligerency, and that the Geneva Convention proceedings related to conduct of
prisoners tried for acts after capture, not for "war crimes" committed before captre. Thus having found the statutory and treaty requirements inapplicable, they
refused to consider the due process of law element.
The late Justices Murphy and Rutledge joined in a vigorous and outspoken
dissent. These dissenting opinions make up the appendix to this book and are
termed by the author as a "great contribution to the caus' of human freedom". The
opinions agree in almost every detail with the theory of the case presented by the
defense.
The defense counsel made one last attempt to save their client's life. Since
the Supreme Court had not disposed of the case on its merits (the action was for
a writ of habeas corpus), they felt that General MacArthur might, in view of this
fact, and in view of the two very vigorous dissents agree to a commutation of tht
sentence to life imprisonment. They had previously composed a "recommendation
for clemency" arguing that this was the "first time in the history that a commanding officer had been held criminally liable for acts committed by his troops. And
that it was the first time in modern history that any man has been held criminally
liable for acts which according to the conclusion of the Commission did not involve
criminal intent or even gross negligence." Hoping for a commutation, copies of
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the opinions of the court were immediately dispatched to General MacArthur, and
he was informed of this fact by radio. But before the dispatched opinions had left
the U.S., General MacArthur issued a statement to the press in which he disclosed
that he had ordered Yamashita to be hanged.
The opening statement of the MacArthur announcement reveals just how
"impartial" his review must have been. "It is not easy for me to pass judgment
upon a defeated adversary in a major campaign", the statement began. "I have reviewed the proceedings in vain search for some mitigating circumstances on his
behalf. I can find none."
Frank M. Davis*
*Librarian, Dickinson School of Law
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